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PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC REGULATION: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITISH AND
AMERICAN TAKEOVER CONTROLS
BRIAN E. ROSENZWEIG*
“There is no financial system in the world which does not depend to
a large extent on the moral standards and disciplines of self1
regulation.”

INTRODUCTION
The hostile takeover is a powerful tool of corporate governance.2
A hostile tender offer enables the shareholders of a target
corporation to effect a change of control against the will of the
incumbent board of directors.3 The ability of the tender offer to alter
the management of a corporation in such a drastic fashion led both
4
the United Kingdom and the United States to institute controls over
hostile takeover transactions. Despite clear similarities between their
business5 and legal structures,6 the United Kingdom and the United
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1. Sir Nicholas Goodison, quoted in THE PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS,
REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31ST MARCH, 1987, at 3 (1987).
2. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and
Why?-The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1733
(2007).
3. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 646-47 (2d ed. 2003).
4. The United Kingdom, England, Britain, Great Britain and all derivations thereof are
used synonymously. Any differences among the application of the City Code or other takeover
regulations in the several parts of Great Britain are beyond the scope of this note.
5. See Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Governance: Some Points of
Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 51 (1998). The
corporate cultures of both England and the United States feature unitary corporate board
structures, disfavor employee codetermination, and place great emphasis on financing through
public securities markets. These characteristics distinguish the English and American
economies from those of other large developed nations, such as Germany that favors a twotiered board structure, supports codetermination, and relies on banks for guaranteed financing,
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States have pursued strikingly different models of corporate takeover
regulation. In England, takeovers are regulated by the City Code on
Takeovers and Mergers (City Code or Code), which is interpreted
and enforced by the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (Takeover
Panel or Panel), a self-regulatory body appointed by bodies
representing different segments of the British financial community.7
In the United States, an overlapping system of state and federal laws
8
and regulations controls bids for corporate control.
This Note illustrates the differences and similarities between
England’s self-regulatory, standards-based system and America’s
more formal, rules-based system. Particularly, this Note will focus on
the structural and procedural attributes of these systems, the “mode”
9
of regulation, as opposed to the substantive rules that govern
takeovers. Part I describes the procedures and structures employed
by the Takeover Panel to amend, interpret and enforce the City
Code. Part II illustrates the system of overlapping state and federal
authority in the United States. Part III contrasts the two systems and
examines the prospect of convergence.
I. TAKEOVER REGULATION IN ENGLAND
A. Origins of the City Code on Mergers and Takeovers
In the early postwar era, the City of London (City)10 was faced
with a simple choice about controlling the burgeoning takeover
and Japan where keiretsu control corporations through extensive cross holdings of stock and
maintain guaranteed financing relationships with banks. Id.
6. In the field of business law, similarities between English and American law are so
common that the term “Anglo-American” is often used by scholars in comparative analyses of
business law provisions. See, e.g., Robert Weber, Can the Sauvegarde Reform Save French
Bankruptcy Law?: A Comparative Look at Chapter 11 and French Bankruptcy Law From an
Agency Cost Perspective, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 257, 283-84 n.115 (2006) (comparing the contract
options available under the “Anglo-American” and French models with regard to bankruptcy
proceedings); Cally Jordan, The Conundrum of Corporate Governance, 30 Brook. J. Int’l L. 983,
1002 (2005) (referring to the “Anglo-American securities industry”).
7. LAURENCE RABINOWITZ, WEINBERG AND BLANK ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS §
4-1002 (5th ed. 2005). The Takeover Panel is now backed by the Financial Services Authority.
This development will be discussed in Part I-B below.
8. CHRISTIN M. FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 74-75 (European Monographs No. 41, 2002).
9. In their recent article, Professors Armour and Skeel use the term “mode” to refer to
the procedural and structural elements of regulatory regimes. Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at
1729.
10. The City of London refers to the close-knit community of financial institutions
traditionally based in the area of London known by the same name. Id. at 1730.
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market:11 either submit to legal regulation by the government or
12
adopt a system of self-regulation. At that time, underutilization of
assets and mismanagement made many British firms ripe targets for
takeovers.13 In the absence of specialized legislation, common law
courts were left to settle disputes over the defensive measures taken
14
Due to concerns over timeliness and
by incumbent boards.
uncertainty, however, investors were not satisfied with the
15
16
dependence on litigation. The City Code was first drafted in 1968
by a working party of City institutions as a solution to the perceived
threat from hostile corporate bidders.17 The Code was comprised of
18
ten General Principles and thirty-five rules. The Takeover Panel, a
non-governmental body composed of representatives from British
financial, industry and investor trade associations,19 is responsible for
20
regulating takeovers through the administration of the Code.
In its earliest form, the Code lacked statutory authority and the
only means of sanction available to the Takeover Panel was the
21
public censure of violators. In order to compel compliance with the
Code, the Panel implored the investment banks that advised parties
in takeover transactions to honor its rulings by holding the banks
responsible for their clients’ violations.22 The threat of losing the
professional services and capital of the City investment banks
23
compelled bidders and target boards to follow the Code.

11. See Alan Hughes, The Impact of Merger: A Survey of Empirical Evidence for the UK, in
MERGERS AND MERGER POLICY 30, 37 (James Fairburn & John Kay eds., 1989) (indicating
that merger activity increased significantly in the late 1950s and again in the late 1970s).
12. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1002.
13. James J. Fishman, Enforcement of Securities Laws Violations in the United Kingdom, 9
INT’L TAX & BUS. LAW. 131, 196 (1991). The Code was actually the second attempt at selfregulation by the City. In 1959, a working group organized by the Bank of England
promulgated Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses, a set of rules designed to instill
fairness in the takeover market. These rules did not provide an adequate solution to the
problem. Id.
14. See Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on
the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 436 (2007).
15. Id.
16. THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS (8th ed. 2006) (U.K.), available at
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/ [hereinafter CODE].
17. Fishman, supra note 13.
18. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 442.
19. CODE, supra note 16, § A(4)(a)(iv).
20. Id. § A(1).
21. See Johnston, supra note 14, at 444.
22. Id.
23. See Fishman, supra note 13, at 196-97.
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B. The Structure and Activities of the Takeover Panel
The Code sets out the organizational structure of the Takeover
24
The makeup of the Panel
Panel and its subcommittees.
demonstrates its business-oriented, self-regulatory nature. Members
of the Panel are appointed by various bodies such as insurers,
investment companies, private and institutional investment
management firms, banks, industry, accounting firms, investment
banking houses and pension funds.25 The Executive, which carries out
26
the ground-level supervision of takeovers independent of the Panel,
is comprised of “employees and secondees from law firms,
accountancy firms, corporate brokers, investment banks and other
27
organsations.”
Leading the Executive is the Director General,
usually an investment banker who is concurrently an officer of the
Panel.28
Each member of the Panel is assigned to one of two committees.
The Code Committee is the rule-making arm of the Panel,
responsible for proposing and reviewing amendments to the Code.29
The Hearings Committee, on which the Chairman and Deputy
Chairman sit, is responsible for reviewing the decisions of the
Executive.30 Assisting the Hearings Committee in this function is a
Secretary, often a partner at law firm.31 Appeals of the decisions of
the Hearing Committee are heard by the Takeover Appeal Board
(formerly known as the Appeal Committee), an independent body,
usually led by former judges with experience in takeover law.32
1. Amending the Code.
Rule-making and amendment
33
responsibilities are delegated to the Code Committee. Once the
Code Committee decides to pursue an amendment to a certain
provision, it releases a Public Consultation Paper (PCP), detailing the
extent of the proposed amendment and soliciting views of interested

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

CODE, supra note 16, § A(4).
Id. § A(4)(a)(iv).
Id. § A(5).
Id.
Id.
Id. § A(4)(b).
Id. § A(4)(c).
Id.
Id. § A(8)(a).
See id. § A(4)(b).
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parties.34 After reviewing the position papers submitted by interested
industry actors in response to the PCP, the Code Committee releases
a final version of the amendment in the form of a Response
Statement.35 The Code Committee may amend the Code without
going through the formal consultation process when the proposed
amendment “does not materially alter the effect of the provision in
question or is a consequence of changes to relevant legislation or
36
regulatory requirements.”
2. Enforcing the Code. Traditionally, the Takeover Panel has
37
relied in large part on community pressure to enforce its rulings. In
spite of the original absence of direct statutory authority, the Panel
was successful in compelling compliance with its rulings. In 1987,
Robert Alexander, Chairman of the Panel, explained in his personal
statement to the Panel’s Annual Report one reason why nonstatutory regulation has been successful under the Code:
It is sometimes said that the Panel lacks adequate power of
sanction. In fact, the decisions of the Panel are in practice complied
with. Almost all of those with whom the Panel deals are concerned
to comply, and to be seen to comply with the Code. This reflects in
very great part the grave damage to the reputation of individuals,
advisers and companies which would result from a breach of the
38
Code or a failure to accept our decisions.

Alexander’s statement illustrates that maintaining a strong reputation
for honesty and fair dealing is important to success in the City
business community. When the Panel determines that there has been
a violation of the Code, it may issue a public statement of censure
39
alerting the financial community to the misconduct. Censure has
particularly strong force because of the close-knit nature of the City
40
financial community.
Over time, the Government has also become more involved in
enforcing the Code. As the European Union has moved toward
convergence in takeover control, there has been increased pressure

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 21-23.
THE PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31ST
MARCH, 1987, at 5-6 (1987).
39. CODE, supra note 16, § A(11)(b)(ii).
40. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1771-72.

05__ROSENZWEIG.DOC

218

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2008 1:29:59 PM

[Vol 18:213

on Member States to become involved in takeover regulation.41
England’s first response to the rising tide of EU takeover control was
the endorsement procedure. Under the Financial Services and
Markets Act (FSMA) of 2000,42 the Financial Services Authority
(FSA) can endorse the Code, permitting the FSA to take action
against parties or advisors who violate provisions or principles of the
Code.43 In April 2001, at the request of the Takeover Panel,44 the FSA
issued Consultation Paper 87, proposing the formal endorsement of
45
the Code. The endorsement was modified and adopted in a Policy
Statement issued in October 2001.46 Endorsement of the Code by the
FSA had two significant effects.
First, the endorsement enabled the Takeover Panel to request
that the FSA enforce the Code. Following a process termed “co47
operation” by the FSA, the Panel could refer a matter to the FSA
after it determined that a party has committed a violation of the
48
Code. The FSA could then exercise its statutory mandate to compel
compliance. These procedures enhanced the reliability of Code
enforcement because it gave the Panel an additional means of
compelling compliance beyond the “soft pressure” formally relied
upon.
Second, the endorsement institutionalized the practice of “cold
49
shouldering.” In general, “cold shouldering” is the adoption of a

41. See THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT AND ACCOUNT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 31
MARCH 2006, at 7 (2006).
42. FINANCIAL SERVICES AND MARKETS ACT, 2000, c. 8, § 143 (Eng.), available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/Acts/acts2000/00008—k.htm#143 [hereinafter FSMA 2000].
43. See RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1030 n.1; see also FSMA 2000, supra note 42.
44. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER 87: ENDORSEMENT OF THE CITY CODE ON
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF
SHARES § 2.7 (2001), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp87.pdf [hereinafter CONSULTATION
PAPER]. The endorsement embodied in Consultation Paper 87 largely replicates the
endorsement of the Code that existed under the Financial Services Act 1986, which was
repealed upon passage of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. See id. § 1.2.
45. Id.
46. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., POLICY STATEMENT: ENDORSEMENT OF THE CITY CODE ON
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS AND THE RULES GOVERNING SUBSTANTIAL ACQUISITIONS OF
SHARES, FEEDBACK ON CP87 AND MADE TEXT (2001), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/
ps87.pdf [hereinafter POLICY STATEMENT].
47. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 44, § 1.3.
48. CODE, supra note 16, § A(11)(b)(iv). See also THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND
MERGERS, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2001, at 10 (2001) [hereinafter 2001
REPORT] ( “[T]he principal effect of endorsement is that if a firm fails to comply with the Code,
the Panel can request the FSA to take enforcement action against that firm.”).
49. See POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 46, at 21.
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rule by an organization that prohibits its members (or those entities it
regulates in the case of government body) from dealing with parties
50
that have violated the rules of a different regulatory body. Section
4.3 of the FSA Handbook codifies cold shouldering:
A firm must not act, or continue to act, for any person in
connection with a transaction to which the Takeover Code
applies . . . if the firm has reasonable grounds for believing that the
person in question, or his principal, is not complying or is not likely
51
to comply with the Takeover Code.

Cold-shouldering clearly lends additional weight to the Panel’s
decisions and statements.
In 2006, the legal relationship between the FSA and the
Takeover Panel was modified to achieve compliance with the
52
European Takeover Directive. The Companies Act designates the
Takeover Panel as the entity authorized to promulgate and enforce
53
takeover rules for the British market. This designation gives the
Panel statutory authority to impose sanctions, a power previously
unavailable to the Panel. 54 The new statutory regime replaces the
55
endorsement arrangement that existed under FSMA 2000, but
56
retains the statutory cold shoulder mechanism. The persistence of
the statutory cold shoulder mechanism indicates that the FSA will
continue to sanction regulated parties that engage in business or
transactions with parties against whom the Panel has issued an
adverse decision.
However, the new arrangement enables the FSA to take action
in certain circumstances without the request of the Panel, such as in
cases of market abuse.57 While the FSA indicates that its routine
practice will be to defer to the Panel with regard to sanctions and
enforcement and that it will not take action until the Panel concludes
50. CONSULTATION PAPER, supra note 44, § 1.5.
51. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK, MARKET CONDUCT (MAR) § 4.3.2, available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/4/3 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter
MAR].
52. Johnston, supra note 14, at 446.
53. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 943(1) (Eng.).
54. See id. § 952; see also Johnston, supra note 14, at 447 n.112.
55. Section 4 of the FSA Handbook’s MAR indicates that the Endorsement of the Code, §
4.2, ceased to be in force as of May 2, 2007. MAR, supra note 51, § 4, available at
http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/4 (last visited Dec. 20, 2007).
56. See id. § 4.3.1, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/MAR/4/3.
57. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK, DECISION PROCEDURES AND PENALTIES
MANUAL (DEPP) § 6.2.26, available at http://fsahandbook.info/FSA/html/handbook/DEPP/6/2
(last visited Dec. 20, 2007) [hereinafter DEPP].
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its inquiry,58 the ability of the FSA to take unilateral action is a
departure from the original operation of the Panel as a purely selfregulatory body.
These amendments clarify the ability of the FSA to both enforce
the Code and to support the Panel in enforcing the Code. While the
FSA has indicated that its working relationship with the Panel is
59
unmodified by the statutory realignment, there is a subtle difference
from the endorsement procedure. Under the old mechanism, the
FSA could not act absent a request from the Takeover Panel, whereas
under the current scheme, the FSA has the authority to enforce
without a request from the Panel. This subtle shift will not
dramatically affect the independence of the Panel if the FSA chooses
not to act unilaterally, but the arrangement may encourage the FSA
to become increasingly involved in takeover regulation in the future.
3. Interpreting the Code. The Executive is responsible for
interpreting the Code.60 The Executive may “give rulings on points of
interpretation, application or effect of the Code which are based on
61
Further, as the Executive
the particular facts of a case.”
recommends that concerned parties address the Panel with questions
of interpretation early in the bid process so as to avoid any later
disputes,62 the Panel is routinely able to review takeover proposals
prior to their introduction.63
The Executive permits parties to seek ex ante clarifications of the
Code on a “no names” basis, meaning that such a request need not
64
identify the parties involved in the proposed transaction. However,
such interpretations are non-binding and do not immunize a party
65
that acts in conformity therewith during any later Panel proceedings.
These rulings are confidential, can be rendered very quickly (often

58. Id. § 6.2.22.
59. E-mail from M. Ali, Consumer Contact Centre, Financial Services Authority, to Brian
Rosenzweig, (Oct. 10, 2007, 12:16 EST) (on file with author).
60. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6).
61. Id.
62. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1020.
63. For example, in the year ended March 31, 2006, the Panel reviewed 151 takeover
proposals, an increase from 114 the previous year. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS,
REPORT
ON
THE
YEAR
ENDED
31
MARCH
2006,
at
9
(2006),
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/reports/DATA//Report2006.pdf.
64. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6)(a).
65. Id.
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within twenty-four hours), and do not require formal proceedings.66
The ability of parties to seek informal, confidential advice from the
Panel Executive is a unique aspect of the Code.
Parties subject to the Code may also seek more formal
67
interpretations from the Executive. In order to obtain a decision
upon which a party may legally rely, a party must give all relevant
68
details of the proposed transaction, including all parties’ names.
Mindful of the sensitivity of these details, the Panel strictly guards the
information revealed.69 The Code also provides that obtaining
professional advice on the interpretation of the Code in lieu of an
70
official ruling is not appropriate. This instruction further encourages
parties to consult the Panel directly and effectively limits the use of
legal opinions rendered by professional service firms.
Decisions of the Executive may be appealed. The first appellate
71
level is the Hearings Committee. A matter may reach the Hearings
Committee in one of four ways. First, a party subject to a ruling by
the Executive may appeal that ruling to the Hearings Committee.72
Second, the Executive may request a ruling from the Hearings
73
Committee without rendering a decision itself. Third, the Executive
may refer a case to the Hearings Committee where it believes a party
74
has breached the Code or a prior ruling regarding the Code. Finally,
the Code provides the Executive the discretion to seek Hearings
Committee review where it deems it appropriate.75
Hearings Committee proceedings are informal and are typically
held in private maintaining the confidentiality of sensitive
information.76 Though parties may bring solicitors and financial
advisors with them to hearings, they almost always represent
themselves to the Committee. 77 Also, formal rules of evidence are

66. See RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1020.
67. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6)(b).
68. See Id.
69. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1023 n.4.
70. CODE, supra note 16, § A(6)(b).
71. See id. § A(7)(a).
72. Id. § A(7)(a)(i).
73. Id. § A(7)(a)(ii).
74. Id. § A(7)(a)(iii).
75. Id. § A(7)(a)(iv).
76. Id. § A(7)(c).
77. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1023. According to Rabinowitz, “[i]n cases of special
difficulty the Panel has, very exceptionally, allowed a barrister to put the case of one of the
parties.” Id. § 4-1023 n.2.

05__ROSENZWEIG.DOC

222

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

5/27/2008 1:29:59 PM

[Vol 18:213

not employed during hearings.78
Decisions of the Hearings
Committee are typically published in a Panel Statement, a document
released after the decision has been communicated to the parties
involved.79 The final forum of review for the interpretation of the
80
The Takeover Appeal Board
Code is Takeover Appeal Board.
publishes its decisions, also redacting confidential or commercially
sensitive information.81
In certain circumstances, the Takeover Panel may be subject to
judicial review by courts of law.82 In Ex Parte Datafin,83 the Court of
Appeal established that the Panel is subject to judicial review because
“it perform[s] or operate[s] as an integral part of a system which
perform[s] public law duties.”84 “Judicial review” is a carefully
selected term in this context, since, as Rabinowitz explains, “courts of
law will [not] operate as a court of appeal from Panel decisions;
rather they will operate as a court of review.”85 The courts will not
86
review the Panel’s findings of fact or evaluation of evidence. The
role of the court in such a case is limited to determining whether the
Panel has committed “[an] illegality . . . [acted with] irrationality . . .
or [committed] a procedural impropriety.”87 Judicial review might be
possible when a party challenges the good faith basis of the Panel’s
exercise of its disciplinary powers88 or where the Panel grants
89
individual exceptions from the operation of the Code. The Court of
Appeal has expressed great deference towards the Panel’s decisions,
especially with regard to the interpretation of its own rules.90 The

78. See id. The procedures described in reference to the Hearing Committee are also
employed by the Takeover Appeal Board. Id at § 4-1026 n.5.
79. CODE, supra note 16, § A(7)(c).
80. See id. § A(8).
81. Id. § A(7)(b).
82. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1012.
83. [1987] Q.B. 815 (U.K.).
84. RABINOWITZ, supra note 7, § 4-1012 n.1.
85. Id. § 4-1012.
86. Id.
87. See id. (quoting ex parte Datafin, [1987] Q.B. at 842).
88. See id. § 4-1015 (referring to “bona fides”).
89. See id. (suggesting that judicial review might be appropriate where the Panel “grant[s]
dispensation[s] from the operation of the Code.”).
90. See id. § 4-1014 (quoting Sir John Donaldson, Master of Rolls of the Court of Appeal,
that “[w]hen it comes to interpreting its own rules, it must clearly be given considerable latitude
both because, as legislator, it could properly alter them at any time . . . . Where there might be a
legitimate cause for complaint and for the intervention of the court would be if the
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general principle of Datafin, according to Rabinowitz, is that courts
will not disturb Panel decisions, even where the Panel has
overstepped its authority or acted unreasonably, if doing so is not in
the public interest.91
C. Substantive Rules of the Code
Section B of the Code, entitled “General Principles,” sets out the
foundational concepts of the substantive rules contained within the
92
Code. Parties subject to the Code are required to honor the General
Principles as well as the more detailed rules elaborated in the Code.93
The Code further instructs that the rules, while expressed in more
specific language than the General Principles, are still not technical in
nature and “are to be interpreted to achieve their underlying
94
purpose.” In this way, the Takeover Panel requires that parties
follow not only the letter of the Code, but also its spirit. The FSA
explains that “principles-based regulation means, where possible,
moving away from dictating through detailed, prescriptive and
supervisory actions.”95 The FSA argues further that the principlesbased approach “foster[s] a more innovative and competitive
96
financial services industry;” and that “[i]n a quickly changing
marketplace, principles are far more durable [than legal rules].”97
When taken in the context of the strengthening of the Panel’s
statutory backing through the expansion of FSA authority described
above, the goal of principles-based regulation suggests that the FSA is
striving to maintain Britain’s self-regulatory heritage. In addition to
the preference for principles over rules, the Code includes several
provisions, two of which are discussed here, that differ significantly
from corresponding American provisions.
First, the Code requires target corporations to obtain
shareholder approval before taking actions that might frustrate a
interpretation were so far removed from the natural and ordinary meaning of the words of the
rules that an ordinary user of the market could reasonably be misled.”).
91. See id. § 4-1016 (suggesting that the “general tenor” of Datafin is that “the court will
only set aside a Panel decision if [doing so] is in the public interest,” and that accordingly,
“decisions will not be disturbed if to do so would be in the public interest.”).
92. CODE, supra note 16, § B
93. See id. § A(2)(b).
94. Id.
95. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON THE OUTCOMES
THAT MATTER 4 (2007), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 6.
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potential offer or prevent a shareholder vote on the merits of a bid.98
In restricting defensive actions, the Code endorses the theory that
hostile tender offers are beneficial transactions that offer
shareholders an opportunity to remove entrenched management and
receive fair value for their shares.
Second, the Code incorporates a mandatory offer rule. When a
bidder seeks to acquire more than thirty percent of the outstanding
shares of a target corporation, the Code requires not only that the
bidder be able to finance the acquisition of all remaining shares, but
also that the bidder make an offer to all shareholders at the highest
99
price paid for any share in the thirty percent block. This rule serves
to protect shareholders of the target from “predatory” transactions
that involve a tender offer for a substantial majority of shares,
followed by a freeze-out merger of the remaining shares.
D. Conclusion
The defining characteristic of the British system is self-regulation
based on general principles. The FSA has taken an increasingly
influential role in the enforcement of the Code, but the development,
interpretation and initial enforcement of the Code are all still
squarely within the control of the Panel. The Code is the work of all
of the stakeholders in the financial community, from service
institutions like brokerage houses and investment banks, to
institutional investors such as pension funds and insurers. What
distinguishes the British system100 is the proximity between the
regulators and the regulated parties. Such a system undoubtedly
lends credibility to the regulations and builds trust within the system.
II. TAKEOVER REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Takeover regulation in the United States is an amalgam of
federal and state law. The U.S. Constitution limits the powers of the
federal government, reserving the remaining authority to the states.101
Federal government involvement in the control of hostile takeovers
has taken the form of securities laws, most notably the Williams

98. CODE, supra note 16, § I(21)(1)(a).
99. Id. § F(9).
100. This is not to say that British system is unique, as it has served as a model for several
other takeover control regimes, such as Ireland and Australia. See NICOLE E. CALLEJA, THE
NEW TAKEOVERS PANEL- A BETTER WAY? 35-40 (2002).
101. FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 16-17.
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Act.102 Limited federal jurisdiction leaves issues of general corporate
103
Under the doctrine of internal
activity and policy to the states.
affairs, the law of the state where a firm is incorporated governs the
activities of the firm, the actions of its officers and directors and the
104
relationship between the firm and its shareholders.
A. Federal Regulation: The Williams Act
In response to the increasingly common use of the tender offer as
105
a means of accomplishing corporate takeovers in the 1960s,
Congress passed the Williams Act amendments to the Securities
106
Prior to the passage of the
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).
Williams Act, unregulated tender offers were a popular alternative to
statutory mergers.107 Under the existing securities laws, bidders were
required to make little disclosure to the shareholders of target
108
corporations in the context of tender offers. The Williams Act and
the subsequent regulations promulgated under it set out general rules
109
and procedures for tender offers, including requirements for
110
111
disclosure and filing. These federal provisions control the tender
offer process by placing substantive obligations upon bidders. While
the focus of federal takeover regulation is on the bidder’s actions,
some commentators have explained that intention of Congress was to
create a system that was neutral as between the interests of hostile
bidders and incumbent managers.112 Nevertheless, it is important to

102. Id. at 74-75.
103. Id. at 17.
104. Id.
105. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 478 (4th ed. 2002).
106. Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), n(d)(f)).
107. HAZEN, supra note 105, at 478-79.
108. Id. at 479.
109. Rule 14d-7 provides for free withdrawal of tendered securities prior to the expiration of
the offer. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-7 (2007). Rule 14d-8 provides for pro rata acceptance of shares in
an oversubscribed tender offer. Rule 14d-10 provides for a best price rule. See HAZEN, supra
note 105, at 496-501.
110. Section 13(d) of the Williams Act provides that any person who acquires beneficial
ownership of more than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class of registered equity
securities must file a disclosure statement, alerting investors to the buyer’s identity and
intentions. See HAZEN, supra note 105, at 484-85.
111. Section 14(d) of the Williams Act provides for the filing of materials fully and fairly
describing the offer. See Id. at 493.
112. See FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 75.
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recognize how the mode of federal takeover regulation is limited in
scope.
1. Refining Federal Takeover Rules. The Williams Act itself
113
provides for certain substantive requirements and practices, but in
114
other areas the statute is ambiguous. Congress, in fact, drafted the
federal securities laws broadly, leaving room for the Securities and
115
Exchange Commission (SEC) to clarify issues. As Professor Hazen
explains, “[t]he SEC has broad rule-making powers under the various
statutes it administers and has exercised its authority by prescribing at
116
least three different kinds of rules.”
First, the SEC promulgates
rules defining the procedures to be followed in Commission
proceedings.117 Second, the SEC promulgates rules that fill in the
118
For
terms of statutes over which it has authority to regulate.
example, § 14(d)(6) of the 1934 Act (added by the Williams Act)
provides for pro rata acceptance of tendered shares even if the offer
does not so require.119 “Rule 14d-8, extends the pro rata requirements
to the entire period of the tender offer,”120 thereby preventing an
offeror from extending an offer period in order to affect pro rata
121
Third, some SEC rules define general terms used in
distribution.
the statutes.122 Interestingly, though the term “tender offer” is not
explicitly defined in the Williams Act,123 the SEC has continually
124
Outside of
refused to promulgate a rule clarifying the definition.
formal rules, the SEC can also create law through more informal
means, most commonly though SEC releases.125 While releases are

113. For example, § 13(d) of the Williams Act provides for disclosure. See HAZEN, supra
note 105, at 484-85.
114. See id. at 3 (explaining that “[t]he statutes are, however, quite sketchy or ambiguous in
many important areas”).
115. See id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 496.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3.
123. Id. at 486.
124. See id. at 487-88 n.15 (explaining that what is used instead of a formal definition is an
“eight factor test which is not contained in an official SEC release [but] has evolved over a
period of time and is discussed in [several federal court cases]”).
125. Id. at 3.
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meant to be interpretive, they do have precedent value.126 The SEC
occupies an important role in clarifying and refining federal takeover
rules.
2. Enforcing the Williams Act Provisions. The 1934 Act grants
the SEC authority to investigate all potential violations of Williams
127
The SEC also has subpoena power,128 greatly enhancing its
Act.
ability to investigate misconduct and build cases against violators.
Accordingly, the SEC has the ability to file lawsuits in federal district
courts to compel compliance with Williams Act provisions.129
The SEC always has standing to bring lawsuits under the
Williams Act, but in certain circumstances, private parties may also
pursue litigation to enforce Williams Act provisions.130 While the
Williams Act does not explicitly provide for any private right of
action,131 federal courts have interpreted certain provisions of the
132
For example, in
Williams Act to grant private rights of action.
Polaroid v. Disney, the Third Circuit held that a target corporation
has standing to sue for an injunction to stop a tender offer under §
14(e) of the Williams Act for misrepresentation. 133 Though the Court
also found that, in this case, the target corporation lacked a cause of
action to sue for a violation of the All Holders Rule amendment to
the Act,134 it explained that a private right of action does exist for
shareholders under that rule.135 Private rights of action grant
individual shareholders, and in some cases, target corporations, a
powerful tool with which to resist (or merely delay) tender offers.
Further, it is important to recognize that private rights of action may
not be a realistic option for some potential plaintiffs due to the high
cost of filing and pursuing lawsuits in federal court.
126. Id. at 31.
127. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2006).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b). See also HAZEN, supra note 105, at 878 (explaining that “the
issuance of an order authorizing a formal investigation gives the SEC staff subpoena power.”).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d).
130. HAZEN, supra note 105, at 518-19.
131. CHARLES R.T. O’KELLY & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 1012 (5th ed. 2006).
132. Edward F. Greene, Andrew Curran & David A. Christman, Toward a Cohesive
Approach to Cross-Border Takeover Regulation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823, 835 n.60 (1997).
133. 862 F.2d 987, 1003 (3d Cir. 1988).
134. Id. at 1001-02. The court explained that “[t]he All Holders Rule states that a bidder’s
tender offer must be open to ‘all security holders of the class of securities subject to the tender
offer.’” Id. at 991-92 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-10(a)).
135. Id. at 993.
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3. Interpreting Federal Takeover Rules. Interpretation and
development of federal takeover regulation is a combination of SEC
clarification and common law jurisprudence. Along with formal rulemaking and issuing informal policy statements, the SEC also
136
interprets the law through the “no action” letter process. No action
letters are private requests for ex ante indications of the legality of a
proposed action under the federal securities laws.137 No action letters
reflect the personal interpretation of SEC staff members, and they do
not bind the SEC to any particular position in a subsequent formal
proceeding and the existence of a no action letter in favor of an action
does not preclude a party from challenging such an action in a
privately initiated suit.138
Further, the federal courts routinely hear cases brought under
Williams Act provisions, either by the SEC or by private parties.
These rulings create federal common law precedent within their
respective federal jurisdictions and provide persuasive authority in
other federal districts and circuits.
B. State Law Concerning Takeovers
State regulation of corporate takeover activity takes two distinct
forms: state corporation laws, which govern the activities of corporate
entities chartered within that state139 and state anti-takeover statutes,
which operate in a fashion similar to the Williams Act.140 The
practical effect of this overlapping system is that actions of target
boards are constrained by state corporation law, while the actions of
bidders are constrained by federal law.141
1. State Corporation Law. States control takeovers through
constraints on the activities of target corporations. As the seat of
many of America’s largest corporations, Delaware is by far the most
142
Disputes involving
influential state with regard to corporate law.
corporate takeovers most often find their way to Delaware’s
Chancery Court in the form of a suit for injunction.143 In this type of

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

HAZEN, supra note 105, at 31.
Id.
Id. at 31-32.
FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 17.
Id. at 87.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1743.
See FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 17; see also Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1755.
Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1743.
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suit, bidders contest the defensive actions of the incumbent board of
144
Accordingly,
directors, often alleging violations of fiduciary duty.
dissatisfied parties may look to state law to contest either the actions
of a bidder or the defensive measures taken by a target in the context
of a tender offer. Through a series of prominent cases, the Delaware
courts have elaborated several concepts through which takeover
defenses are analyzed. When compared to the British system under
the Code, Delaware law provides target boards with far more latitude
in crafting defenses to hostile bids.145
146
In Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, the Delaware Chancery Court
upheld the self-tender offer of a target corporation that was designed
147
Under Unocal, defensive measures are
to defeat a hostile bid.
permitted where directors act “in good faith and upon a reasonable
investigation”148 and the measures taken are “reasonable in response
to the threat posed.”149 In permitting Unocal’s self-tender, the Court
permitted a tender offer that was specifically designed to exclude a
particular party, the hostile offeror. This kind of disparate treatment,
however, was effectively outlawed by a subsequent amendment to the
150
Williams Act, the All Holders Rule. It is important to realize that
Unocal’s shareholders were not given the opportunity to decide the
merits of the hostile bid.
Shareholder rights plans, often known as “poison pills,” are a
common defensive measure utilized by corporations to fend off
hostile tender offers. Under Delaware law, corporations may endow
shares with special rights or privileges.151 These rights plans may be
created by the board of directors without the need for a vote by the
152
A poison pill plan allows shareholders to purchase
shareholders.
additional securities upon the occurrence of a certain event, often the
purchase of a substantial number of shares by a hostile bidder. 153
Poison pill plans come in several varieties, but the common effect of
such plans is that the holdings of a hostile bidder are diluted,

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 17.
See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1756.
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
See id. at 958.
Id.
Id. at 955.
COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 683.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157 (2001).
COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 658.
Id. at 655.
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increasing the cost of a takeover transaction.154 The legality of
shareholder rights plans and other defensive measures taken by
incumbent management have been litigated heavily in the Delaware
courts. In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,155 the Delaware
Supreme Court upheld a poison pill rights plan as a permissible
156
Revlon Inc. v.
defensive measure under the Unocal doctrine.
157
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. further refined the Unocal
doctrine by holding that the reasonableness of defensive measures is
to be assessed in terms of obtaining the most valuable consideration
for target shareholders, not guarding the risk of a change in control.158
Some commentators argue that the Delaware cases exemplify an
“absolute expansion in the freedom of directors to adopt defensive
measures in response to hostile takeovers.”159 However, Professor
Ventoruzzo suggests that the Delaware cases “reflect a difficulty in
developing clear rules to govern at such a delicate intersection
between protecting against management’s self-interest and allowing
strategic management decision-making.”160 This theory questions the
utility of fiduciary duty to achieve the goals of corporate takeover
regulation. Litigation of fiduciary duty claims is inherently factdependent, an ex post assessment that does not generate clear or
simple rules to instruct future actions. While it is clear that target
boards in the United States have an enhanced ability to utilize
takeover defenses, this does not indicate that the American system
disfavors takeover in general.
2. State Anti-Takeover Statutes. Since the passage of the
Williams Act in 1968, many states have adopted anti-takeover laws
161
Some of these provisions go
specifically regulating tender offers.
beyond protecting investors from manipulation by bidders and are
aimed at deterring takeover activity to protect incumbent
162
management and the local business community.
Such provisions

154. Id. at 655-56.
155. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
156. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 656.
157. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
158. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 664.
159. See Marco Venturouzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation:
Regulatory means and Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171, 188 (2006).
160. Id.
161. See HAZEN, supra note 105, at 538.
162. Id.
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are known colloquially as “shark repellents.”163 State anti-takeover
statutes have evolved over time in response to federal legislation and
federal-court litigation regarding the constitutionality of such state
laws.
The “first generation” of state takeover laws granted state
regulators great authority to analyze the substantive merits of
takeover bids.164 State regulators could initiate hearings or hold
hearings at the request of interested parties.165 Such hearings and
statutory waiting periods served to slow the tender offer process. In
166
Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Supreme Court held that the Illinois antitakeover statute violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution because “the State has no legitimate interest in
167
protecting nonresident shareholders.”
In response to the Edgar case, some states modified or adopted
168
A theme among the second
new anti-takeover provisions.
generation of statutes is reliance on the state’s authority to monitor
corporate governance, as opposed to the state’s authority to regulate
the trading of securities.169 Indiana, for example, passed a “control
share acquisition” statute, which provides for restricted voting by
shareholders whose ownership exceeds twenty percent of the
outstanding shares.170 The statute further provides for a mandatory
meeting of shareholders to vote on the offer within fifty days,171 a term
longer than the Williams Act requires.172 The bidders challenged the
173
Indiana statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America to no
avail, as the Supreme Court upheld the statute on the grounds that
the delay was not unreasonable and that the bidder was not
disadvantaged.174 Professors Cox and Hazen comment that the Court
was loathe to invalidate the statute for fear of undermining the long-

163. Id.
164. COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 691.
165. Id.
166. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
167. Id. at 644.
168. FORSTINGER, supra note 8, at 76.
169. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 692.
170. See id. at 692-93.
171. Id.
172. Rule 14e-1 requires that a tender offer must held open for at least twenty business days.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (2007).
173. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
174. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 693.
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standing internal affairs doctrine.175 As a regulation of the activities of
corporations and not as a control on transactions in shares, the
Indiana statute was able to pass constitutional muster.
In the wake of the CTS Corp. decision, several states have passed
further anti-takeover provisions. Third generation statutes are
geared towards preventing freeze-outs of minority shareholders after
a tender offer is made to gain control. New York’s “freeze” statute
prohibits a cash-out merger within five years of a change of control
tender offer if the tender offer was not approved by incumbent
176
Delaware’s statute requires a three year waiting
management.
177
period. Since these freeze statutes are based on the states’ authority
to regulate the internal affairs of state charted corporations, they are
protected from constitutional Commerce Clause scrutiny under CTS
Corp.
C. Conclusion
The American system of takeover regulation is a combination of
federal statutes and regulations, state anti-takeover statutes and state
fiduciary duty concepts. At times the doctrines intersect, as with state
anti-takeover statutes and the federal Williams Act. In other
instances, the interpretation of one body of law will drive the
development of another, as when the Unocal case prompted the
adoption of the “All Holders” provision of the Williams Act.
Even though American takeover law has many sources, several
themes underlie the system in general. First, there is a clear desire for
minimum standards of fairness in the tender offer process. Since the
protection of investors has always been a principal goal of federal
securities regulation, it is unsurprising that fairness and equity for all
shareholders is a primary concern. However, the focus on minimum
standards has necessitated regulation through strict rules, which can
enable creative directors to evade the spirit of the regulation. In
order to check director creativity, regulators need to monitor current
practices and adjust regulations to keep up with innovation. This puts
pressure on regulators, such as the SEC, as well as state judiciaries
and legislatures, to make sure that their respective systems are well

175. Id.
176. N.Y Bus. Corp. Law § 912 (McKinney Supp. 2002). See also COX & HAZEN, supra note
3, at 694.
177. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001). See also COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 694.
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situated to serve those constituencies who rely on them for
protection.
III. ANALYSIS
The British and American models differ significantly in the
means through which takeover regulations are promulgated,
interpreted and enforced. British takeover rules are promulgated by
a single entity acting with jurisdiction to control nearly all aspects of
the tender offer process. Regulated entities are required to follow the
letter as well as the spirit of the Code. The self-regulatory structure
of the Panel reduces the incidence of litigation between adverse
parties, while the proximity between the regulators and the industry
players means that the Panel has enhanced credibility. In the United
States, decentralized regulation based on legal rules leaves room for
market actors to seek innovative solutions to takeover problems. In
order to keep up with market innovation, regulators, courts and
legislatures need to continue to refine takeover provisions so as to
ensure protection of shareholders while providing an efficient market
for corporate control. Also, the availability of defensive actions in
the United States can make hostile transactions more complicated
and costly.
Professors Armour and Skeel explain that the prohibition of
defensive measures in the British market increases the frequency and
the rate of success of hostile bids.178 In analyzing the effects of the
differing modes of regulation, they argue that the American system is
less shareholder-friendly.179 They argue that the shareholder-friendly
regime developed in Britain because institutional investors were
better organized and more powerful in Britain at the time that
takeover regulation was taking hold.180 By contrast, institutional
investors were far less prominent in the United States, due to high
181
rates of share ownership by individuals and laws restricting the
ability of certain entities, such as banks, from becoming significant

178. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 2, at 1738 (indicating that 0.85% of takeover bids in
the United Kingdom are hostile, compared to 0.57% in the United States, and that 43% of such
bids are completed in the United Kingdom, as opposed to 24% in the United States).
179. Id. Armour and Skeel further explain that high personal dividend income taxes in
Britain, combined with tax relief for collective investment schemes, such as pension funds,
fueled institutional share ownership. Id. at 1768-69.
180. Id. at 1793.
181. See id. at 1768 (indicating that in 1970, shortly after the passage of the Williams Act,
nearly eighty percent of shares were own by individual investors).
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shareholders.182 Now that institutional share ownership has increased
significantly in the United States and may even outpace institutional
183
share ownership in Britain, the question is no longer why the
shareholder-friendly regime developed in Britain, but whether the
American system actually disadvantages American investors.
The American approach to takeover regulation appears to be
more costly than the British system. First, in the United States, the
duration of takeover bids is not limited by law, while British takeover
184
Second, American
bids must be completed in a limited timeframe.
takeover disputes are often litigated in court, resulting significant
legal fees, whereas in Britain the Panel is quick to respond to
takeover disputes and legal fees are minimized due to the general
185
absence of lawyers at Panel proceedings. One possibility is that the
efficiency and reduced costs of the British system, coupled with freer
shareholder choice, result in a more favorable system for
shareholders. However, it is also possible that the availability of
takeover defenses and the more deliberate, rule-based adjudication of
disputes can actually prove beneficial to shareholders.
The increased costs of launching a hostile takeover in the United
States, generated principally by defensive tactics and the possibility of
takeover litigation, should encourage more negotiated transactions.186
An increased number of friendly transactions may actually be
beneficial to shareholders. In principle, corporate boards are in an
ideal position to value merger consideration because they know their
businesses and have access to the most current and relevant
information. Permitting target boards to shape the tender offer
process can allow competent boards to veto poor offers and increase
the likelihood of more favorable offers. In short, the preference for
director involvement in shareholder decision making may represent a
positive value judgment, despite the overwhelming appeal of
shareholder choice. This theory does have overtones of paternalism,
which is logical given Armour and Skeel’s explanation of the origins

182. Id. at 1752.
183. See id. at 1768-69.
184. Id. at 1746-47.
185. Id. See also supra Part I.B.3.
186. Certain features of the British system also increase costs compared to the American
system. One notable example is the mandatory offer rule, requiring bidders to line up financing
for a full takeover where more than thirty percent of the outstanding shares are sought. See
supra Part I.C.
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of the American policy. However, this paternalism is not necessarily
outdated, despite the change in share ownership patterns.
While hostile takeovers are less frequent in the United States,
187
they are still a very real threat to delinquent corporate boards.
Additionally, the rise of institutional share ownership in the United
States has not resulted in any significant changes in takeover
regulation. In fact, some institutional shareholders have embraced
their independent, detached role in corporate governance. For
example, the California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CALPERS) Focus List Program, which identifies underperforming
corporations, has had a positive effect in improving the performance
and governance of highlighted companies.188 The increased numbers
of highly sophisticated shareholders does not diminish the capacity of
responsible corporate boards to determine the value of takeover
offers. It is the role of the board of directors to help shareholders
decide and understand the merits of takeover proposals, thus
increasing the number of negotiated offers should serve to better
educated shareholders about their options. Finally, a recent study
concluded that the shareholders of American corporations receive
greater premiums for shares of corporations involved in merger and
acquisition transactions.189 The study indicates that the average share
price premium paid in American merger and acquisition transactions
(both friendly and hostile) exceeded the average premium paid in
British M&A transactions by approximately six percent.190 These data
indicate that the U.S. market demands a higher premium, perhaps in
part because the American takeover regime promotes higher-priced,
negotiated deals.
The notion that American takeover regulation favors incumbent
management at the expense of shareholders must be considered
against the general backdrop of comparative corporate governance.
As explained earlier, the threat of a hostile takeover has the effect of
keeping incumbent managers honest, but it is by no means the only
tool available to shareholders. Derivative litigation, which is a more

187. See supra note 186.
188. See Julie Earle, Laggards that are brought into line, FINANCIAL TIMES (U.K.), April 14,
2003, at 1, available at http://search.ft.com/nonFtArticle?id=030414003023.
189. Gregory Jackson & Hideaki Miyajima, Varieties of Capitalism, Varieties of Markets:
Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan, Germany, France, the UK and USA 50 (Research Inst. of
Econ., Trade & Indus., Discussion Paper Series 07-E-054, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012210.
190. Id. These data reflect premiums paid during the period of 2000-2005. Id.
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robust remedy in the United States than in the United Kingdom, also
provides a mechanism through which shareholders can exert pressure
191
Contingent attorney fees for plaintiffs
on incumbent managers.
increase the ability of shareholders to pursue derivative suits in
192
America, whereas the “loser pays” system and the absence of
contingent fee arrangements make derivative litigation more difficult
in England.193 And while Miller argues that derivative litigation and
hostile takeovers are not perfect substitutes for one another because
194
they address different forms of mismanagement, the specter of
derivative suits must provide additional protection to American
shareholders. If takeover law is viewed as a piece of the larger
corporate governance system, it is possible that the American system
may provide comparable protection to shareholders, despite the
appearance of reduced shareholder choice in hostile takeover
transactions.
CONCLUSION
The rising influence of the FSA may suggest a certain degree of
convergence between the British and American models of takeover
regulation. While the Panel continues to operate independently, the
addition of a firmer statutory foundation to the British system
enhances the reliability of enforcement. The ability of the FSA to
target Code violators for market abuse provides an extra layer of
protection for the British financial markets. In the past, the
augmented role of the FSA and its insistence that it will not disturb
the Panel’s activities were met with some skepticism. Shortly after
the endorsement procedure was implemented, uncertainty was
reported among the London bar about whether the arrangement
would result in the FSA taking a more active role in takeover
regulation.195 According to the Panel itself, cooperation between the

191. See Miller, supra note 5, at 61-68.
192. See id. at 75-76.
193. See id. Miller explains that the legal doctrines also differ significantly. American
courts have clearly recognized the right of shareholders to bring derivative suits, whereas British
courts have permitted such suits only as an exception to the general rule that a company, and
not its shareholders, may pursue actions for damages caused to the company. See id. at 60-65.
194. Id. at 78.
195. See Lawyers question hands-off role for FSA on takeovers, 21 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 3, 3
(2002) (quoting Chris Bright of Shearman & Sterling that “[o]ne can expect tension and it seems
likely that the oversight of the FSA will be increasingly required. In the abstract, the FSA can
be hands off, but when hard cases come along . . . you will have to ask if the authority can
maintain this stance”).
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FSA and the Panel under the endorsement mechanism was
196
successful and the Panel remains hopeful that the relations with the
FSA will continue to be positive under the new regime.197 However,
the possibility still remains that the new statutory system will enable
increased litigation or result in the FSA’s involvment in actual
regulation of takeovers.
Just as the British are incorporating principles of statutory
backing, the American system stands to benefit from an exchange of
ideas and best practices. The theory of principles-based regulation
that is promoted by the FSA serves an equally beneficial purpose in
the context of American regulation. Promoting fairness and positive
outcomes through principles-based regulation would be a positive
step for American regulators. Principles are not adverse to statutory
regulation; it is possible to encourage market participants to meet
general standards of fairness without discouraging innovation or
market efficiency. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Ben
Bernanke, recently suggested that the United States would benefit
from incorporating British principles-based concepts.198 Furthermore,
encouraging market players and regulators to work together could
prove important for the continued vitality of American markets. It is
essential for all involved to recognize that regulation is not a zero sum
game; enforcing sensible rules creates benefits for all participants and
provides reliability and security to a domain that, if left alone, would
likely be chaotic and unfair.

196. THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2002, at 9 (2002),
available at http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/reports/DATA%5CReport2002.pdf.
197. THE TAKEOVER PANEL, REPORT ON THE YEAR ENDED 31 MARCH 2007, at 9 (2007),
available athttp://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/new/reports/DATA//Report2007.pdf.
198. See Jeremy Grant, Bernanke calls for UK-style regulation, FINANCIAL TIMES (U.K.),
May 15, 2007, at 1.

